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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) because this is an appeal from a final decision of the District 
Court. This appeal has been transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
A. Questions Presented and Standards of Review 
1. Did the District Court err in entering its Order dismissing Deer Crest 
Associates I, L.C. ss ("Deer Crest") Complaint and entering judgment in favor of Silver 
Creek Developmeat Group, L.L.C. ("Silver Creek55)? 
2. Has the appellant preserved and/or asserted any legally recognized ground 
for challenging the binding decision of the arbitrator? 
B. Standards of Review 
New issues on appeal: Claims not raised in the district court may not be raised for 
the first time on appeal. Duke v. Graham, 2007 UT 31, f 26, 158 P.3d 540 (Utah 2007). 
A party must give the district court an opportunity to address the purported error or is 
precluded from raising the issue on appeal. Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, If 15, 127 P.3d 
1256 (Utah 2007). 
District Court's Findings: A trial court's factual findings will not be disturbed 
unless they are shown by marshaling of all evidence in the record supporting the trial 
court's findings to be clearly erroneous. U.R.C.P. 52(a); Bluffdale Mt. Homes, LCv. 
1 
Bluffdale City, 2007 UT 57, \ 46, 582 Utah Adv. Rep. 41. The application of law to facts 
found at trial is a mixed question of fact and law. Wayment v. Howard, 2007 UT 56, ^  9, 
144 P.3d 1147 (Utah 2007). This Court defers to the district court's application of law to 
the facts, granting broad deference when the issue is extremely fact dependent. Id. "In 
addition, when appealing a highly fact dependent issue, the appellant has a duty to 
marshal the evidence." Id. The law applied is reviewed for correctness. Jones v. 
Barlow, 2007 UT 20, f 11, 154 P.3d 808 (Utah 2007). 
District Court's Conclusions of Law: Legal conclusions should be "reviewed for 
legal correctness." Morse v. Packer, 973 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah 1999); State v. Deli, 861 
P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993) ("We accord the trial court's conclusions of law no deference 
but instead review them for correctness."); Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax 
Commission, 858 P.2d 1381, 1384 (Utah 1993) ("[W]e afford no deference because they 
are conclusions of law and are therefore reviewed for correctness."). 
C. Issue Preservation 
Silver Creek asserts that Deer Crest has not properly preserved various issues for 
appellate review. This Court's rules require an appellant to demonstrate that issues raised 
on appeal were properly raised and preserved in the district court. U.R.A.P 24(a)(5)(A), 
(B). Deer Crest has failed to comply with this Rule. Further, because Deer Crest raises 




U.C.A. § 78B-11-101 etseq is of central importance to this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Nature of the Case and Proceedings Below 
This is an action commenced by Deer Crest for Silver Creek's alleged breach of a 
contract for the construction of a portion of a condominium project in Wasatch County, 
Utah. Deer Crest filed this action in December 2007 against Silver Creek in District 
Court. Silver Creek filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that Deer Crest had not 
made a demand for arbitration within thirty days after its claim had arisen, as provided 
for under the parties' Agreement and therefore Deer Crest's claim was barred. Record on 
Appeal ("R") at 39-45. In the alternative, Silver Creek sought an order from the Court 
compelling arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause in § 19.1 of the construction 
contract. Id. The District Court granted Silver Creek's motion to compel arbitration and 
stayed the matter pursuant to statutory requirements. R. 76-78. The District Court ruled 
that Deer Crest waived its right to a judicial determination when it entered into an explicit 
agreement to resolve all disputes by binding arbitration. 
Deer Crest then filed a claim with the American Arbitration Association. In 
response thereto Silver Creek filed a Motion to Dismiss and argued that Deer Crest had 
not made a timely demand for arbitration under the provisions of the construction 
agreement and thus, the American Arbitration Association lacked jurisdiction to consider 
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Deer Crest's claim. The arbitrator agreed and issued a written decision in which it ruled 
that "Deer Crest waived its right to arbitration under the Contract Documents by failing 
to file its demand within the time set forth in the Contract Documents. Therefore, [the 
court ruled] AAA lacks further jurisdiction to resolve this matter under the Contract 
Documents." R. at 81. Consequently, Deer Crest's claim was dismissed from 
Arbitration. Id. 
B. Disposition in the District Court 
After the Arbitrator dismissed Deer Crest's claim as untimely, Deer Crest moved 
the District Court to lift the stay to allow it to litigate its claims in district court. R. 78-
80. Silver Creek opposed the motion on the grounds that Deer Crest's claims against 
Silver Creek had been dismissed in arbitration pursuant to a binding arbitration 
agreement, and Deer Crest was precluded from asserting its claims in the courts. R. at 
92-] 11. Following briefing and oral argument, the District Court denied Deer Crest's 
Motion to Lift Stay and dismissed Deer Crest's Complaint with prejudice, awarding 
Silver Creek its attorney fees. R. at 194-198. 
C. Statement of Facts 
In July of 2005 the parties to this matter entered into an Agreement which contains 
a mandatory arbitration clause, stating the following: 
All claims, disputes and other matters in question between the parties to 
this Agreement, arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the breach 
thereof shall be decided by arbitration in accordance with Construction 
Industry Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association unless 
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the parties mutually agree otherwise. Notice of the demand for arbitration 
shall be filed in writing with the other party to the Agreement and with the 
American Arbitration Association. The demand shall be made within (30) 
days after the claim, dispute or other matter in question has arisen. . .The 
award rendered by the arbitrators shall be final, and judgment may be 
entered upon it in accordance with applicable law in any court having 
jurisdiction thereof. 
R. at 23-27; Agreement § 19.1 (emphasis added), addendum Exhibit A. 
On February 5, 2007 Deer Crest terminated its Agreement with Silver Creek 
because of Silver Creek's alleged failure to timely complete the work pursuant to the 
terms of the Agreement. R. at 86. 
In December 2007, approximately ten (10) months after the claim arose, Deer 
Crest originally filed its claims against Silver Creek in the District Court for the Fourth 
District of Utah, Heber Department. R. at 3-6. In response, Silver Creek filed a Motion 
to Dismiss asking the Court to dismiss the action as untimely pursuant to the contractual 
limitation period agreed to by the parties. R. at 40. In the alternative, Silver Creek 
requested the court to dismiss the judicial action and order the parties to arbitration. Id. 
On February 5, 2008 the District Court issued its Ruling and Order denying Silver 
Creek's Motion to Dismiss in part, but granting the alternative request for arbitration. R. 
at 76-78. The Court ordered the parties to arbitrate the dispute and stayed the judicial 
proceedings "pending completion of the arbitration." Id.\ Ruling and Order, addendum 
Exhibit B. In refusing to grant Silver Creek's motion to dismiss, the Court referenced 
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and adopted Deer Crest's position that "the timeliness of a demand for arbitration is for 
the arbitrator to decide." Id; Ruling and Order p. 2. 
On March 13, 2008, more than thirteen (13) months after the claim arose, Deer 
Crest commenced arbitration proceedings by filing a Notice of Intent to Arbitrate with 
the American Arbitration Association ("AAA"). Thereafter, Silver Creek filed a Motion 
to Dismiss, again raising the argument that Deer Crest's claims were not asserted within 
the contractual limitation period for the filing of claims. R at 81-87. 
On August 5, 2008, the arbitrator issued a written Ruling on Respondent's Motion 
to Dismiss. ("Arbitrator's Ruling", addendum Exhibit C; R at 81-87). The arbitrator 
carefully analyzed the contract between the parties, including § 19.1 in particular, and 
concluded that the parties agreed to require that any claim be filed within thirty (30) days 
after the claim, dispute or other matter in question arises. Arbitrator's Ruling, p. 3; R at 
81-87. 
The arbitrator then considered the question of when the claim arose and 
concluded, as a matter of law, that the claims could not have arisen any later than 
February 5, 2007, "the date Deer Crest terminated its contract with Silver Creek because 
of breach." R. 81-87. Therefore, the arbitrator concluded that Deer Crest's claim was 
untimely and granted Silver Creek's Motion to Dismiss. Id. Significantly, Deer Crest 
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has not challenged the arbitrator's determination that its claim was untimely under the 
contract. 
Deer Crest subsequently filed a Motion to Lift the Stay in the District Court from 
which this appeal is taken. R. at 79-80. By its Motion, Deer Crest sought to litigate this 
matter in District Court after it was dismissed from arbitration. Silver Creek filed an 
opposition to Deer Crest's Motion and asked that the Court dismiss Deer Crest's 
Complaint with prejudice. R. at 92- 111. After briefing and oral argument on Deer 
Crest's Motion to Lift Stay, the District Court dismissed the case with prejudice and 
entered judgment in favor of Silver Creek. R. at 194-198. ("Order", addendum Exhibit 
D; R at 194-198). The District Court based its Order on the following findings of fact 
and conclusions of law: 
Findings of Fact: 
1) That the matter was properly referred to arbitration and that the arbitrator issued 
a written ruling granting Silver Creek's Motion to Dismiss, finding that Deer Crest 
failed to file a demand for arbitration within the thirty day limitation period set 
forth in the parties' agreement. Because of Deer Crest's failure to file a timely 
claim, the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to hear Deer Crest's claim. R. at 197. 
2) On July 1, 2005, the parties entered into an AIA A101-1997 Standard Form of 
Agreement Between Owner and Contractor ("Agreement"). Paragraph 19.1 of the 
Addenda to that Agreement, which was made an enforceable part of the 
Agreement, requires that "[a]ll claims, disputes and other matters in question 
between the parties to this Agreement, arising out of or relating to this Agreement 
or the breach thereof, shall be decided by arbitration .... The demand [for 
arbitration] shall be made within thirty (30) days after the claim, dispute or other 
matter in question has arisen." Id. (emphasis added). 
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3) The Court, having reviewed the record, found that Deer Crest's demand for 
arbitration was filed beyond the thirty day limitation period set forth in paragraph 
19.1 of the parties' agreement. Id. 
Conclusions of Law: 
1) That the Agreement between the parties is enforceable, and that the parties 
knowingly and intentionally agreed to submit any claim or dispute arising out of 
the Agreement to binding arbitration and agreed to be bound by paragraph 19.1 of 
the Agreement and the thirty (30) day limitation on the time for filing an 
arbitration demand contained therein. R. at 196. 
2) That Deer Crest's execution of the Agreement constituted a knowing and 
intentional waiver of any right to a judicial remedy under Article I, §§7 and 11 of 
the Utah Constitution.1 See Duke v. Graham, 158 P.3d 540, 546 (Utah 2007). The 
Court concluded that strict enforcement of paragraph 19.1 of the Agreement would 
not violate Deer Crest's constitutional rights. R. at 196. 
3) The Court concludes that Deer Crest having waived any right to a judicial 
remedy, and having had its arbitration claim dismissed for failure to timely file the 
same, Deer Crest has no right to seek a judicial remedy. R. at 196. 
Notably, Deer Crest has not properly challenged the District Court's determination that 
Deer Crest knowingly and intentionally waived its right to a judicial remedy when it 
executed the Agreement. Although the Court characterized Deer Crest's waiver as a 
conclusion of law, it is either a finding of fact or a mixed question of fact and law. As 
such, appellant is required to marshal the evidence. Deer Crest has not marshaled the 
evidence to challenge this finding. Indeed, the pertinent and unrebutted fact is that Deer 
Crest signed the Agreement. See U.R.C.P. 52(a); Bluffdale Mt. Homes, LC v. Bluffdale 
City, 2007 UT 57, \ 46, 582 Utah Adv. Rep. 41(A trial court's factual findings will not be 
disturbed unless they are shown by marshaling to be clearly erroneous); see also 
Wayment v. Howard, 2007 UT 56, % 9, 144 P.3d 1147 (Utah 2007) (Appellate Courts 
defer to the district court's application of law to the facts, granting broad deference when 
the issue is fact dependent). To the extent Deer Crest has challenged the Trial Court's 
findings of fact, such should be disregarded for its failure to marshal. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Deer Crest's Complaint was properly dismissed with prejudice from the District 
Court because the Court had no authority or jurisdiction to hear Deer Crest's claim as it 
had been dismissed pursuant to a valid arbitration proceeding. Deer Crest has not 
challenged the arbitrator's decision on any statutorily recognized grounds. By 
intentionally and knowingly entering into a valid and binding agreement to arbitrate, 
Deer Crest waived its right to a judicial determination of its claims against Silver Creek. 
Finally, Deer Crest's constitutional rights have not been violated because an 
arbitration proceeding affords due process and provides a party their "day in court" to the 
same extent as judicial proceedings. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER DISMISSING DEER CREST'S 
COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
1. The District Court Properly Dismissed Deer Crest's Complaint With 
Prejudice Because the District Court Had No Authority to Hear the Matter 
as it Had Been Dismissed by an Arbitrator Acting Within the Scope of and 
Pursuant to a Valid Arbitration Proceeding. 
It is well established in Utah that "[arbitration is a method of dispute resolution 
involving one or more neutral third parties whose decision is binding." Miller v. USAA 
Casualty Insurance Company, 44 P.3d 663, 673 (Utah 2002). At arbitration, parties are 
afforded the opportunity to present evidence and examine witnesses. After evaluation of 
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the evidence, the arbitrator makes an award resolving the issues presented. Of paramount 
importance is the fact that "the arbitration award is binding and enforceable in court." 
Miller at 673; U.C.A. § 78B-11-123; see also 4 Am. Jur. 2d Alternative Dispute 
Resolution § 193 (2008) (an arbitrator's judgment has the same effect as a judgment of a 
court of last resort); General Exchange Ins. Corp. v. Harmon, 157 S.W.2d 126 (1941) 
(the arbitration judgment, if within the scope of the arbitration agreement, is as binding 
on the parties as a judgment of a court of law). 
Under Utah law it has long been established that the award of an arbitrator 
determines the rights of parties as efficiently as a judgment secured by legal procedure 
and is binding on the parties until set aside or its validity is questioned in some proper 
manner. Giannopulos v. Pappas, 15 P.2d 353 (Utah 1932). Indeed, "a court has no 
authority to review the action of arbitrators to correct errors or to substitute its conclusion 
for that of the arbitrators acting honestly and within the scope of their authority." Id. at 
356. 
In very limited situations, the law provides a mechanism whereby parties who are 
dissatisfied with an arbitration decision may seek review. However, judicial review of 
arbitration decisions is only on narrowly prescribed statutory grounds and is only 
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available in certain circumstances. See also DeVore v. IHCHospitals, Inc., 884 P.2d 
1246 (Utah 1994) (judicial review of arbitration awards should not be pervasive in scope 
or encourage repetitive adjudications but should be limited to the statutory grounds and 
procedures for review). Further, an arbitration award will not be disturbed on account of 
irregularities or informalities in the proceeding or because the court does not agree with 
the award. Id. 
Deer Crest and Silver Creek entered into a negotiated and binding written contract 
which provided that all disputes arising thereunder would be submitted to and resolved 
by binding arbitration. See Agreement at § 19.1. By entering into a binding arbitration 
See U.C.A. § 78B-11-124: (1) Upon motion to the court by a party to an arbitration 
proceeding, the court shall vacate an award made in the arbitration proceeding if: 
(a) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means; 
(b) there was: 
(i) evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral arbitrator; 
(ii) corruption by an arbitrator; or 
(iii) misconduct by an arbitrator prejudicing the rights of a party to the arbitration 
proceeding; 
(c) an arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing upon showing of sufficient cause for 
postponement, refused to consider evidence material to the controversy, or otherwise 
conducted the hearing contrary to Section 78B-11-116, so as to substantially prejudice 
the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding; 
(d) an arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator's authority; 
(e) there was no agreement to arbitrate, unless the person participated in the arbitration 
proceeding without raising an objection under Subsection 78B-11-116(3) not later than 
the beginning of the arbitration hearing; or 
(f) the arbitration was conducted without proper notice of the initiation of an 
arbitration as required in Section 78B-11-110 so as to substantially prejudice the rights of 
a party to the arbitration proceeding. 
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agreement, the parties intentionally and knowingly waived their rights to have their 
claims resolved judicially. The parties5 agreement to arbitrate is an enforceable and 
binding contractual agreement that precludes the parties from asserting claims in court. 
See Duke v. Graham, discussed infra. Deer Crest signed the Agreement and agreed to its 
terms. See Agreement. In fact, Deer Crest acknowledged the binding nature of the 
Agreement by submitting its claims to arbitration. R. at 81-87. Deer Crest's claims were 
subsequently adjudicated in arbitration and dismissed as having been untimely filed. Id. 
Because the parties contractually agreed to mandatory binding arbitration and because 
Deer Crests' claims have been dismissed with finality from an arbitration proceeding, no 
judicial appeal lies. 
Deer Crest cannot simply choose to set aside the arbitration decision because it 
disagrees with the outcome. Nor can the court second guess or review the arbitrator's 
decision, even though it disagrees with the decision. Therefore, the District Court's 
Order should be affirmed and Deer Crest's Appeal must be denied pursuant to the above 
authorities which hold that a decision reached in a valid arbitration proceeding is binding 
3
 Deer Crest now seeks to ignore the parties' contractual agreed-upon procedure 
for the adjudication of all disputes. Deer Crest argues that although it had knowingly and 
intentionally waived its right to a judicial determination of its claims, it should 
nonetheless have the opportunity to litigate its claims in district court after a decision 
dismissing this matter was rendered in a valid and binding arbitration proceeding. See 
Brief generally. 
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on the parties to the same extent as a judgment rendered in a court of law. See Miller at 
673.4 
2. The District Court Properly Concluded That The Parties Waived Their 
Rights to a Judicial Determination of All Claims. 
Parties express their clear intention to waive their rights to a judicial determination 
of claims when they contract for and select mandatory binding arbitration as the sole 
forum for adjudication. Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court has recently affirmed this 
principle and held that "an agreement... to submit to arbitration any existing or 
subsequent controversy arising between the parties to an agreement is valid, enforceable, 
and irrevocable except upon a ground that exists at law or in equity for the revocation of 
a contract." Duke v. Graham, 158 P.3d 540, 542 (Utah 2007). The Duke Court further 
held that parties waive "their right to a judicial proceeding through an express agreement 
to arbitrate" Id. at 546; See also Pacific Development, DC. v. Orton, 23 P.3d 1035, 1039-
1040 (Utah 2001) (where the Utah Supreme Court held that a written arbitration 
4
 Arbitration is not a mediation proceeding whereby parties voluntarily come 
together to reach settlement; rather, it is a "method of dispute resolution . . . whose 
decision is binding." Miller at 673. As outlined above, the law in fact provides a means 
whereby dissatisfied parties are able to challenge and appeal an arbitrator's decision in 
court; however, Deer Crest's motion to lift the stay and re-commence litigation in district 
court is not an authorized means recognized under Utah law. See U.C.A. § 78B-11-124 
(outlining the narrow and limited grounds upon which a party may ask the court to vacate 
an arbitration decision). A party is not free to simply ask that the court start over again 
and re-litigate the matter just because the party disagrees with the arbitration decision. 
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agreement constitutes a waiver of parties' rights to formal litigation and that when a party 
has waived its rights to a judicial determination, the court is barred from revisiting the 
arbitrator's decision).5 
Here, the District Court concluded that: 
. . . the Agreement between the parties is enforceable, and . . . the parties 
knowingly and intentionally agreed to submit any claim or dispute arising 
out of the Agreement to binding arbitration and agreed to be bound by 
paragraph 19.1 of the Agreement and the thirty (30) day limitation on the 
time for filing an arbitration demand contained therein. 
R. at 196. 
The District Court then analyzed the above Utah authorities and concluded that 
pursuant to the Agreement's arbitration provision 
. . . Deer Crest's execution of the Agreement constitutes a knowing and 
intentional waiver of any right to a judicial remedy under Article I, §§7 and 
11 of the Utah Constitution. See Duke v. Graham, 158 P.3d 540, 546 (Utah 
2007). 
R. at 196. 
The District Court's conclusion is supported by Utah law and should be affirmed. 
Although Deer Crest does its best to distinguish the holdings of the foregoing authorities, 
Deer Crest's attempt to distinguish Kenny is unpersuasive under the facts of this appeal. 
Kenny simply stands for the principle that where a party is contractually bound to follow 
certain procedures and timelines in order to invoke specified contractual rights, and the 
party fails to do so, the party waives his or her rights. Kenny at 998. Moreover, the trial 
court in Kenny did not provide a second recourse to a party when that party's claims had 
been dismissed in an arbitration proceeding. Id. 
14 
it fails to do so. As conceded by Deer Crest, "where a party is contractually bound to 
follow certain procedures and timelines in order to invoke a specific contractual right and 
fails to do so, the party waives that right." See Brief at 13; see also Kenny v. Rich, 186 
P.3d 989 (Utah App. 2008); Brinton v. IHCHosps., Inc., 973 P.2d 956, 966 (Utah 1998). 
Here, Deer Crest knowingly entered into the Agreement to arbitrate its claims 
against Silver Creek. R. at 196-197; see also Agreement. Because the Agreement was an 
"express agreement to arbitrate", Deer Crest "waived its right to a judicial proceeding . . 
." Duke at 542. This case encompasses the precise situation as envisioned by Duke, i.e., 
because the Agreement is clear and unambiguous as to the parties' intent to arbitrate their 
claims, the parties waived their rights to a judicial determination of any claims arising 
under the Agreement. 
Deer Crest was bound by its agreement to arbitrate. Deer Crest failed to submit its 
claim to arbitration in a timely manner and therefore the arbitrator correctly dismissed the 
same. The District Court then correctly determined that because Deer Crest had waived 
its right to a judicial adjudication of its claims against Silver Creek, it had no jurisdiction 
or authority to review or ignore the arbitrator's order. Therefore, judicial dismissal of 
Deer Crest's Complaint was mandated. R. at 194-198. 
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3. The District Court's Dismissal of Deer Crest's Complaint Did not Violate 
Due Process or The Open Court's Provision of the Utah Constitution. 
As set forth above, the District Court applied established Utah law and properly 
concluded that "strict enforcement of paragraph 19.1 of the Agreement would not violate 
Deer Crest's constitutional rights." R. at 196. 
Utah law supports the District Court's conclusion that a freely-entered-into 
arbitration agreement is a valid waiver of judicial process and does not violate the parties' 
rights to due process. Duke v. Graham, 158 P.3d 540, 546 (Utah 2007); Jenkins v. 
Percival, 962 P.2d 796, 799 (Utah 1998); Lindon City v. Eng'rs Constr. Co., 636 P.2d 
1070, (Utah 1981) (where the Utah Supreme Court held that due process of law does not 
necessarily mean judicial action; rather, due process is in fact afforded by arbitration). 
As in Duke, Deer Crest's argument that it was not afforded due process "fails because 
[Utah Courts] have clearly held that arbitration proceedings do not violate [Due Process 
or the Utah Open Court's provision] . . . [when] the parties have waived their right to a 
judicial proceeding through an express agreement to arbitrate." Duke at 546. 
Deer Crest does not contest this principle; rather, Deer Crest simply makes the 
unsupported argument that since the full merits of its claims have not been heard in the 
District Court, that its constitutional rights have been violated. However, the District 
Court concluded that based on Deer Crest's knowing and intentional waiver of its right to 
16 
a judicial determination, the court was divested of authority to hear the matter.6 R. at 
196. Thus, pursuant to Duke, the trial court's dismissal of Deer Crest's claims do not 
violate Deer Crest's constitutional rights under the Due Process Clause or the Open 
Courts Provision of the Utah Constitution. Duke at 546. 
Moreover, Deer Crest's argument that it was denied due process because the full 
merits of its claims were not heard is undermined by long-established Utah law. The 
appellate courts of Utah have consistently held that a dismissal with prejudice based on 
procedural deficiencies does not violate due process or parties' constitutional rights. 
Colosimo v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Salt Lake City, 104 P.3d 646 (Utah App. 2004).7 
Therefore, because Deer Crest waived its right to a judicial adjudication of its 
claims against Silver Creek and because its claims were properly dismissed from 
arbitration, the trial court did not violate Deer Crest's constitutional rights in dismissing 
its Complaint with prejudice. 
As set forth in Section I, above, Courts have authority to review arbitration awards only 
on narrowly proscribed statutory grounds. Deer Crest has not challenged the arbitrator's 
ruling on any of these narrow grounds. 
7
 See also Gordon v. Maughan, 204 P.3d 189 (Utah App. 2009) (where Utah Court of 
Appeals held that the dismissal of an appeal from justice court when defendant failed to 
follow appropriate procedures did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights); 
Rohan v. Boseman, 46 P.3d 753 (Utah App. 2002) (where Utah Court of Appeals 
affirmed dismissal with prejudice on procedural grounds when plaintiff failed to 
prosecute its case). 
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4. The Arbitrator's Decision to Apply the Thirty Day Time Limit to Seek 
Arbitration Is Binding and Enforceable. 
Contrary to Deer Crest's argument, the Trial Court did not apply a thirty day 
statute of limitations to Deer Crest's claims against Silver Creek; rather, the Court 
dismissed the case based on the parties' Agreement and upon a final decision entered by 
the Arbitrator. R. at 196. However, even if the thirty day limitation set forth in section 
19.1 of the Agreement is construed as a statute of limitations, such is not unreasonable. 
Utah courts have endorsed the widely applied principle that parties may agree on a 
shorter limitation of time for commencing an action for breach than is provided by the 
statute of limitations. This principle has been confirmed and established as far back as 
1919 in Clark v. Lund, 184 p. 821 (Utah 1919) (parties to a contract may agree on a 
shorter limitation of time for commencing an action for breach than is provided by the 
statute of limitations, provided the period agreed on is not unreasonable) and affirmed by 
the Supreme Court in Hoeppner v. Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company, 595 P.2d 863 
(Utah 1979) (where Supreme Court held that Contractual limitations of time in which to 
bring actions on contract, if reasonable, are valid, binding and enforceable).8 
Other jurisdictions generally are in agreement with Utah law. Under Massachusetts 
law, contracting parties may agree upon a shorter limitation period as long as it is 
reasonable. Bull HNInformation Systems, Inc. v. Hutson, 118 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D. Mass. 
1999, rev'd on other grounds 229 F.3d 321 (1st Cir. 2000) (applying Massachusetts law). 
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Thus, the arbitrator made a well reasoned and well supported decision to enforce 
the thirty day contractual limitation period. But that is not the issue on this appeal 
because the parties agreed to be bound by the arbitrator's decision, without a right of 
appeal. Consequently, the decision of the arbitrator, right or wrong, if made in good faith 
and without any violation of U.C.A. § 78B-11-124, is not subject to judicial review. As 
noted above, in this case appellant has not raised below nor asserted in this appeal any 
ground to vacate the award under §7 8B-11-124. 
Therefore, because Deer Crest expressly consented and agreed to bring any claim 
against Silver Creek within thirty days after it had arisen, because the law allows parties 
to contract for shorter time limitations than the applicable statute of limitation, and 
because the arbitrator's decision is not subject to review or appeal, Deer Crest's claims 
are barred as a matter of law. 
Under New York law, parties to a contract may agree to limit the period of time 
within which an action must be commenced to a shorter period than that provided by the 
applicable statute of limitations. Maxcess, Inc. v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 433 F.3d 
1337 (11th Cir. 2005) (applying New York law). 
Under New York law, parties to a contract may designate a reasonable period of 
limitations within which a claim arising out of the contract is to be commenced, even if 
that period is shorter than the statutory period. North American Foreign Trading Corp. v. 
Mitsui Sumitomo Ins. USA, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 2d 295 (S.D. N.Y. 2006) (applying NY 
law). 
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B. DEER CREST CANNOT RAISE THE ISSUE OF AMBIGUITY OF 
AGREEMENT IN ITS APPEAL BECAUSE IT WAS NOT RAISED 
BELOW. 
Although Deer Crest briefly attempts to argue that the District Court erred by not 
finding the Agreement to be ambiguous as to the consequences of failing to abide with 
section 19.1 of the Agreement, Deer Crest has not properly preserved this issue for appeal 
and cannot be heard to argue it now. See Brief at p. 15-16. Deer Crest did not argue 
below that the Agreement was ambiguous and did not preserve this issue below or in its 
Docketing Statement. R. at 143-150; 194-198. It is well established that courts will not 
consider matters raised for the first time on appeal. Wade v. Stangl, 869 P.2d 9, 11 (Utah 
App. 1994); see also Brookside Mobile Home Park, LTD. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, f 14, 
48 P.3d 968, 972; see also State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah App. 1993) (stating 
that for an issue to be properly preserved for appellate review, it must be raised to a level 
of consciousness such that the trial judge can consider it). 
Here, as demonstrated from the trial court's Order and record below, Deer Crest 
did not argue that the Agreement was ambiguous in the District Court proceedings. 
Therefore, Deer Crest's argument that the Agreement is ambiguous with respect to the 
parties' intentions of the consequences of failing to abide with section 19.1 of the 
Agreement must be disregarded. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing points and authorities, Silver Creek respectfully requests 
that this Court deny Deer Crest's Appeal and Affirm the District Court's Order herein. 
as, •6 DATED this C*-May of June, 2009. 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ 
Evan AV&chmutz 
Andy V. Wright 
Attorneys for Silver Creek 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on t h e o ^ ^ a a y of June, 2009 she caused a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing to be delivered to the following: 
Eric G. Easterly 
2524 Fairway Village Drive 
P.O. Box 681238 
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B Ruling and Order 
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D Order 
EXHIBIT A 
J i y ^ Feb 5 09:44:32 2008 435-940-H4BB P. 2 
Document A10T-1997 
Standard Form olAgrewmt B&tw&$n Owner and Contractor 
wher$ the basis cfpaytrmtis a STIPULATED SUM 
J u l y F i v e 
AGREEMENT m&&& as of the First day of bm» ia &e year of Two Tbousaad aad: 
fin wrsfo indicate day, month and y#ar) 
BETWEEN theQwaer: 
(Name, address and ether informatbn) 
Deer Crest Associates I L i X 
853 East Valley Boulevard 
STB #200 
Sas Gabriel Caiiferaia 91776 
Te^cneNtttaban S25-2SG-2S25 
FaxNusnfaer: 626-2804839 
and &e Contractor; 
fNome, address md cth&r lyifofrnativn) 
Silver Creek DevetopiDent Group, LLC, liimted Liability Coxopaay 
3610 North. University Avenue 
STE#275 
Provo, Utah 84604 
TrieptioceNiuaxbw: 80i7374-8500 
Fax Number. 801-3744301 
The Project is: 
(Name and location} 
Deer Crest Town Homes 
Deer Vally, Utah 
The Architect is: 
f/fcme, address and otfutr information) 
ISA Architects, LLC, Limited Lkb2ity Ccrspany 
3115 East UaaLaae 
S3E'#30D 
Sab Lake City, Utah S4117 
TsiephoaeNcxaber: 801-278-8151 
Fax Number 801-Z78-8661 
The Owner and Cco&actor agree as follow. 
ADDITIONS AND DELETIOSS: 
The author of this document has 
addterf information needed for te 
completion. The author may siso 
hewe revised the text of the 
original AfA standard form. An 
Adtf&or&md Options Report 
that notes added Infcmnaiicn as 
wa8 m revisions to the standard 
form text & available from the 
author and &houfd be reviewed. 
A wfcai &*e In tie left margin of 
this document indicates where 
the author has added necessary 
Information and where the author 
has added to or delved from me 
original Af A-text 
This document has important 
legal consequences. 
Consuftafcon vrtth an attorney 
Is encouraged with respecs & 
Its comptetidn or rrK^Scaftcn. 
AIA Document A201-199?, 
Ganers* Conditions of the 
Contract ior Censtnjction, is 
atkpted In this document by 
reference. Do not use with other 
genera! conditions unless this 
document h modified. 
This document has been 
approved and eft doised by The 
Associated Genera! Contractors 
of America. 
AIA oocumtftiAW*~ie*7,c«pyri$ftt $ tets, lets, teas, tesr. «esii t«e, iaw, ieea, t*s?> i«7«, ts?7, ma, i m , test and *s$7 by Tte 
Americanfctfltote of A*enfcids. AH ftgtkis f*g#rv&dL WAfWlNO* this AJA* Oocwrtwias Is proi«€**$fcy U.S, Copytigh*. U w fittf ifiiwnsuontl 7wat$t», 
Un*trthod**d reprotfycHfth or tftetribu&m ot (hi* AiA4 Qoet«neni m any portfon of fit may tt$vit In **vtrt cfrH tntf srimta*? pen**?**, *n$ w&t be 
pr<s*«euttrf to Ik* m*x*mum *x**fti posflfete umfer *h» few, fbfe dosumsftf w*i product fcy AJA softsrar* $ i3;3&25 3ftOSte4&OD* under Ctftfer 
MaJC00118S87J wfcteh *xpif«s on 5rt 8^005, en£ Is not tof r*s*te 
lk*r Notes: (a&IUStSS) 

T i i e ^ e b 5 09:44:32 2008 435-940-0468 P. 3 
ARTICLE 1 THE CONTRACT DOCUMENTS 
The Cqj&act Doctnoents consist of Shis AgreetoenL Conditions of the Contract (General, Supplementary and other 
Cond&oaa), Drawings, Specifications, Addenda Issued prior to execution oftWs Agwm£&> other docsuneaiif listed 
\sx this Ag*w»»«tf aad Modifications issued after execution of this Agreeiaeat; these fane &e Contract, and are as 
fully a part of the Coatract as if attached to thai Agreement or repeated fesreiru The Contract represents the entire 
mi mteps&d agreemeut between the parties hereto aad supersedes prior negotiations, representations or 
*greessents, either written or oral An eaoxueotoa cf the Contract Docotteats, other than Modification** appears to 
Articles. 
ARTICLE 2 TOE WORK OF THIS CONTRACT 
The Contractor sha& folly execute &e W o * described m the Ccafcract #ocmtmoisT except to the exfcmt specifically 
indicated ia the Contract Xtecuxaen& to be the impossibility of others. 
ARTICLE 3 DATE OF CQMMENCEMEMT AND SUBSTANTIAL COMPLETION 
§ 11 The dale of comxneE^emeafc of the Work shall be the date of thia Agreement u&Iess a different date is stated 
below or provtaioo Is made for due date to be fixed in a notice to proceed issued by the Owner, 
(Insert the data of commencement tfit differsfrom the date of this Agreement or, if applicable, state that the date 
mil be fixed xn a notice to proceed) 
The cotnmencgiagot date *fli be fixed in a notice to proceed 
If, prior to the commettt^aamt of the Work, the Owner requires time to file asartgsges, mechanic's Hens and other 
security interests* the O d e r ' s tone reqtfemeat shaE be as follows: 
XA 
§ 2U The Contract Tinoe shall be measured from the date of comsBSBecrcsat. 
§ 3,3 The Contractor shall scbieve Subtfaatifil OnapletiQs of the entire Work not later thm 24Q days from the dale 
of aammensemeaL or as follows; 
{Inserfnumber of calendar daps. Alternatively, a calendar dote m&y be used when coordinated with the date of 
commencement Unless stated elsewhere in the Ceramet Document, insert any requirements for earlier Substantial 
Completion of certain portions of the Work) 
Portion of Work Substantial GempUficn Date 
f*ubj«*toi3uitTO^ ° f c f l w e 0 c e " M l t o f construct 
(Insert provisions, if arty, for liquidated damages relating to failure to complete on time or for bonus payments for 
earty completion of the Wort) 
ARTICLE 4 COKTRACTSUM 
§ 4.1 The Gtvser shall pay the Contractor the Contract Sum m current funds for the Contractors performance of the 
Contract The Contract Sum shall be {$ )* subject to addition and deduction as provided m the Contract 
Documents, $1,588,926.45 J £ * £ ^MjlJA 
§ 4,2 The Contract Sum is based upou the following alternates, if a&y, which are described in the CaatrJct 
Docussents aad are hereby accepts by the Owner 
(State the numbers or other identificaticm of accepted alternates. If decisions on other alternates are to be mode by 
the Owner sttbsequent to the execution of this Agreement, attach a schedule of such ether alternates showing the 
amount for each and the date when that amount expires) 
"Owue^&'&LiUtyiu pujink tirffiao'ispaea wil^ do^fDQtro'biiildigig •ontrflot dmomfcfcy$5Q0&iQQ BuiMiag 
fcAOofctffrxmt A1W< ~ 1 W . Copyright € 1915. « t S r 1325» 1837. iSSJ, 195*, 19$!, 1803, tW7,1574, 1977,19BCt t « 7 r 1991 *nd t2$7t>vTte 
Am*r*cafl Sn*tfoJt» of Attracts, Aftright* r*s*rv»d, WAHtflNO: Thte «A* Dosvmem to ?rm*t;i*& by US. CopyrtgMUw *nrf latamsttonal Treatia* 
Un*utb(Wfc*d r*j>rixJuct$<Mi of rfltIffoutfoft 6f tJus AtA* Dormant, $r «ty pstfton of H, may msuft to **v*f« dvB end criminal psattttit, and w[R b« 
pros*eu*»d to thft maximum extent powifefct undtar ?h« tsw. Thar tfocument *a* prfHft£»ti by A1A K>fty»ar« *t }33&;ZS an tjaa^2004 undei Or^ af 
No. tOOOl 18887 J which «xplf<i on 5W2O05, ««t a re^ tor resale. 
0/ 
b ua:<K:jz ^uua 'tds-d^u-u^bb F. « 
§ 43 Uxat paces, if aay, arc as follows 
Description Unite Pric*{$0JJQ) 
See Addenda **GM Budget f o r IOTJ? s m l i n e i t e i a s 
ARTICLES PAYMENTS 
§5.1 PROGRESS PAYMENTS 
§ 5,1.1 Based upon Applications for Payment $ubrn£?ted to the Owner by the Contractor «ad Certificates for Payment 
issued by the Contractor* the Owner shall make progress payments on account of the Contract Sum to the Coniractor 
as provided below gad elsewhere in the Contract Documents. 
§ 5.12 The period coveted by each Application for Payment ahali be one caieadar tnonth eading on the last day of 
the month, or as follows: 
§ 113 Provided that m AppUc&tion for Payment is received by the Owner not later than the Thirtieth day of a 
ir&nth* the Owner shall :coate^ Thirtieth day of the following no&fo. 
If an Application for Payment is received by the Owner after the application dak fixed above, payjnent shall be 
made by the Owner not later Shan Thirty ( 30 ) days after the Owner receives the Application for Payment 
Sfot more than 1 payment per each 30 day period shall be submitted by Contractor * 
§ 5.1 A Each Application far Payment shall be based on the naosi recent schedule of vaiaes submitted by the 
Contractor in accordance with the Contract Documents. The schedule of values shall allocate the entire Contract 
Sum ajnoxig the various portions of the Work The schedule of values shall be prepared in such form and supported 
by such teu to substantiate its accuracy as the Owner may require. This schedole, unless objected to by the Owner, 
shall be used as a basis for reviewing the Contractor's Applications for Payment 
15.15 Applications for Payment shall indicate the percentage of completion of each portion of the Work as of the 
end of the period^ covered by &e Applicafioa for Paytn&nt. 
§ 5,1 JS Subject to other provisions of the Contract Documents, the asjount of each progress payment shall be 
computed as follows: 
.1 - Take that portion of the Contract Som property allocable to completed Wo* as determined by 
multiplying the percentage completion of each portion of the Work by the share of the Contract Sum 
allocated to that portion of the Work in the schedule ofvatoe^teoQ-rrtoinaflti ft£~-~~4~<^ Pending 
final detenmnasion of costio the Owner of changes in the Work, amounts not in dispute shall be 
included as provided in Section 7,3,8 of AIA Document A2014997; 
,2 Add that portion of the Contact Sam properly allocable to materials and equipment delivered and 
suitably stored "a? the see for subsequent brcorponden in che completed construction {or, if approved 
in advance by the Owner, suitably stored off the site at a. location agreed upon in wciting),46s&~ 
rBtaiifflgbof ( ...)v 
.3 Subtract &e aggregate of previous payments made by the Owner, and 
A Subtract amounts., rf any, for which the Architect has withheld or nullified a Certificate for Payment 
as provided in Scciioa 95 of AIA Document A20M997. 
§ 5.17 The progress payment amount determined in accordance with Section 5.3.6 shall be further modified under 
the following cirxaaastancea' 
.1 Add* npon Substantial Completion of the Work, a sum sufficient to increisc the total payments to the 
Ml amount of the Contract Sam, less such amonnts^as the Owner shall determine for incomplete 
Work* retaisage applicable to m& work and unsettled claims* and 
jUADocumsnt Altf"~1997.C6pyrty* 6191$,18JS, 1825, 1107.19S1.195a, 1«M, 5963,19$M*74.1977, ?980, t9$7.1991 *fld JSS? by The 
Amartean \nmm«l Arafcft&ct*. Afl rigfcfe xm*nm&. WARUHNGi Thi* AUr Decern**** fc proUrcted by i)J$> Copyrtgfct Law and fMKAttiftnaJ Trvattta. 
Uftfcu thorftttfi r*p*<Ktvc$i<?ftor tlfitifauUcmvf ihK AUT OocoiTumt, & any parties of ft, m*y rwatxOL In atvsr* cftli «wl $r>mi«a? jj*mau*s, §r\d wtftfc* * 
prt**cut0d to &e maximum *xt*ni poa*lbte vm<*#? the law. Thfe teum^tv^-pfodatsesfy AiA tolt^tft at !33S:2S on Q5£#20Q4 urc&r Order 
NatOO0tta967J wtteti e*p*res en S/jattBC^ aftd t* no* fts r**ate 
VwHotttK {226titt«5ag 
Tue Feb 5 09:44:32 2008 ^35-940-0466 P. 5 
(Section 9.8JjtfAM. Document A2Q1499? requires release of applicable retaina%e upon Substantial 
Completion of Work with cmsentqf surety, if any*) 
2 Add, if final complsti&a of the Wotfc is therea&er notarially de&yed through so fault of the 
Contractor, any additional amounts payable in acasrdance *ntk Section 5.10.3 of A1A Document 
A30U997. 
§ 118 Reduction or limitation of retainage, if any, stall be as follows: 
(if it is inwidzd, prior to Su&sttmiial Completion oftke entire Work to reduce or limit the retatmge resulting from 
the percentages inserted in Sections 5,L&1 and$J,62 above, mid this is not explained elsewhere in Hie Contract 
Documtnts, insert here provisions for such reduction or Urmtazian-) 
§ 119 Except with the Owner's prior approval, the Contractor stall not mafce advance payments to suppliers tot 
materials or equipment which have no* bees delivered $sA stored at the site, 
$55 A M . PAYMENT 
§ 5.2,1 Final payment, constituting the entire unpaid balance of the Contract Sum, shall be made by the Owner to the 
Contractor when* 
,1 the Contactor has fu&y performed hi Contract exceptfor the Contractor's responsibility to correct 
Wade asprovided ia Section 1222 of AlADoeamest A2Q1~I997V and to satisfy other requirements* 
if any, which extend beyond final payment; and 
2 a fraal Certificate for Payment has been "issued by the Contractor and a C of O has bees issued by 
'. Wasatch Coimtyand the Wauuch County Fire District 
- 3 C o m p l e t i o n o f Owner T > i m c b l i s t s I f a n y . 
§ S.Z2 The Owner's final payment to the Contractor shall be made no iaier than 30 d^ ays after the issuance of the 
Architect's Snai .Certificate for Payment, or as follows: 
ARTICLES TERMINATlOSORSUSPEMaON 
16*1 The Contract may be tenbi&aied by the Owner or the Contractor as provided in Article 14 of AIA Document 
A20MW71 
§12 The Work may be suspended by the Owner as provided in Article 14 of AIA Document A2Q1-1997, 
ARTICLE? MiSCaUNEOUS PROVISIONS 
§ TA Where reference is made in this Agreement to a provision of A1A Document A2014997 or another Contact 
Document, the reference refers to that provision as amended or supplemented by other provisions of the Contract 
Docnmcms. 
§ 72 Payments due and unpaid leader the Contract shalfbear interest from the date payment is doe at the rate stated 
bdo **, or in the absence thereof, at the legal rate prevailing from time to time at the place where the Project is 
located. 
(Insert rate of interest agreed upon, if my.) 
( ) per annum 2% p e r month 
(Usury laws and requirements under the Federal Truth tn Lending Act, similar state and beat consumer credit lam 
and other regulations&t the Owner's and Contractor's principal places ofbusinessr the location of the Project and 
elsewhere may affect the validity of this provision. Legal advice should he obtained with respect to deletions or 
modifications, and also regarding requirements sucft as written disclosures ar waivers.) 
§ 7,3 The Owner's representative is: 
AJfcOacumantMot™ ~iaa?.C*j>yrigM 6 *St5» m% 1*3$, tSfc?( i*St f95S, t9S\, W3.19&7,1874, t*?7, t98Q.1B87, m* artf 1997 by Tf* 
Amariw institute of Afsh*t*e& Aa rights f$s*?v*<i WAGING: Thh A i r Ooctimefti i$ protected &y U.S, Copyright U w *r>d tntfirn*ttan?f TrtaOas * 
UftattfhsrfcSd jeprctffaciJafl fir dtetrfbtfttcft cf fcffls AlA* 0scumftftt,*r*Ay portlO* <Jf it, may re*yfe m sever* cfcrfl »n<i criminal pet^ltJes, an^ win W 
pf««cuN« t« ih« muxltmtm **t*eti p&**\%t* w\4*r lb* !**, This document w « prcd«c«d by AtA seft*mr« K tOiSS*^ cn05te4#0D< urui^ r Ord* 
No.10001tS987_l »midi axpftt* on 5/t8/2QaS, and is not tor IMSI*. 
ff 
(blame, address and other infarrnatlon) 
Scott S. Stedekar 
853 Ssst Valley Boaiev&rd 
STES20O 
San Gabriel; Califcras 91776 
TelephoneNamber 32M8S-85S0 6 2 6 / 1 8 0 - 2 8 2 5 
§ 7,4 The Coskactar'8 refreseatatfv* b; 
(Name* address and ether information) 
Geoffrey Qraaum 
3610 North University A m u e 
STE#2?5 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Tdephane Number 101*374*8500 
F&xNaxoben 801474-8501 
MobLte Haia&*r. 801-362-4423 
1 7 i S r i t t o the Owner's sor the Contractor's representative shall be changed without tec days writtea notice to the 
ctfc&f patfy< 
§ 7,6 Other provision: 
AR71CIE8 SNUMERATIQH Of CONTRACT DOCUMENTS 
§ 8*1 The Contrast Doccanftsts, except to ModiScafciros issued after exec&ticn of this Aj^eemeat, axe enumerated as 
follow fi) date of plans* (5J) addeadms 
§ t i l Tte Agreejcfindt is this executed 1997 edalkm of the Standard Pons of Agreement BetweeaCwaer aad 
Contractor. AIADocuxoeBt A1014397. 
18.15 Tte Gexseral C0ad&ofc$ are cbe 1997 edition of the General CoxtdiiSoas of the Cataract for Cccstnxctias, AIA 
Dooraaeat A2QW997* 
§ 5.1*3 The Sappleaeniary and cither Conditions of the Contract are those contained ia the Project Maauai dated 
and are as follows 
Document T8te P^Q155 
JSA AIA Bu i ld ing 5 
§ 8,14 The SpeciScatioss are those contained m &e Project Maaosl dated as in Section S13, sad are as follows: 
(Either list ite Specifications here cr refer to an exhibit attached to this Agreement) 
Title of Specifications exhibit 
§ 8 15 The Dr&w&gs are as fellow, aad are dated unless a different date i$ ahowa below: 
{Either list the Drawings here or rqfer to en exhibit attached to this Agreement.) 
Title of Dwv&gs exhibit* 
18,16 The Addenda if aay, aie as follows: 
iddeuda ki Timeline Addenda Er Miscel laneous P r o v i s i o n 
A£&*ad& Br General Condi t ions of t h e Con t t ac t & Insu rance Uequircmeats 
Addenda Ct Budget 
kddeuda D: Suaxauty 
MMKO0 IrtKrtwa of ArstuURU, Ml rights nacratf. WANING, Ttat AIA Doeumitt ft preUeiitf by US. CflfytlftM U * smt taiamalioitti Trtttto 
ttnwthorizi* rttpmsfoefcors or tfittrteutia* a* lh& AIA' Opcvmam, o; t«y portion $t ft, m«y f*»Lr$t ir **v*m clvfl *** srimtami pwaftfoi. *n$ wii be 
ptc8fi<i*it* \tt ih* mixJmu^n txteftt pB«Ibit undtr m« kte, Th i^ tixntfttftt wi i ^a5uc^}fey AIA scrfNw* *t t3;35,J5 PA05/2<vaC04 unto Oft3«<* 
Ha^odW«856^^1 wwch tsgavn «n s*is^?os, and is net ty msatt 
Tue Feb 5 0 9 : 4 4 : 3 2 2008 
;Ma* I S OS 0 2 : 5 4 p 
85/17/2885 i%m IS 2628 
Q U I -**--*.. 
KA& f UMS CD. LT* . PAGE 07/20 
l$97provides tm ttfd&toi$ rtqtulrcwcntt wth «* wfaefnsrmcrt pr mv&s&m to JN4 avmmihnx to &&i€rs, fcmpU 
forms <*fitf f&cfe<»w*!#4J4ra^^ TWi A$r«n««n£ Ihey 
'wffi^ni^c^^ U> tfei C$s|riefort «t*te the Afsfeifta* far uoMn Use atoiabfritjan of the 
'oS^tfSUirij i 
-pvs'Cxttf ttaglkllffi* 
(Printed *a#m «rf tfrfc** /• • 
tor USEE* oB|a; ra&ffl&tt x, ixc 
tPrtmd mm* and Me) 
I t a p , f f i t i t m il§M*fa, w , i&*J»nr,twfc, tasM9*t ancnar* % *** 
*««a*. MM figttf* riwiiC{VMibiM»s • »* * i * vectsitfv » «9»caiQ OT «.*< copy ram uw #** iniemtAoftti 7r**ti«s 
_<ue r e o
 3 U3 *„ ,< , U U B ,«-•,.,„_„.„„, 
Additions sad Deletions Report for 
AIA* Document AW f-1997 
This Addition* and Ofcistfora Import, as cfefmtd on page t of tti* assw&eo dosurrHmt, rsprodusas b* &w ail taxi ^ * author has 
addsd to the standi form AiA docum em in order to sompto H* a» w«$ as any text the author may have added to or cteteted from 
toe original AIA text Added taxt ts shown um&rfmacl Oatetsd text Is Seated wcth a horizontal lias through the original AIA text 
Note; This Addrtbns and D«i*fton$ 8sport is provfd«d for Info nation purposes only and & not incorporated foia or constmata any 
pan of tha associated AiA document TOs Add&fcss and Oblations Report and & associated documam wars ganaratad 
simutataaysfy by AiA software «r !3 35£5 on 05#4/2&Q4* 
PAGE1 
AGfiEBSENT made as of the ffirst day of feftf m ihe yew of X^ *o X&ppsaad aad Four 
few tot tewsfti«i» tfl 
8 i g B t t t v ^ B w l ^ 
sKooa 
Silver Creek Deyftlorottttt Psoas, LLC Umt&d Liability Company 
3610 North University AVenae 
STE#275 
Telephone Number. 801 -374-3500 
Peer Cr»t Xowft.Hggffsg. 
J5A Architects. LLg, Limited Liability Compaay 
STS#300 
Silt Late Otv.Uuh 84117 
Tdffjtoae Number 801-278-3151 
?*^ Number 801-278^8661 
AtfdKfcmt tltf Ojtrtmfitport for ASA 0ecum*nt AIDl™ -1WT Copyright * WS tS16t 1925,!S37, iS5f, *S584 *S6ts t«S3v tSS? 1*7* t$77 
1880,1*87,1»f aatf 1S970y Tht Am#rte&* tetitutt of Awhiticti. AH rtgh& *•«*•& WARJJM5, Tfo* AIA* Document i* protected by OS Coawiaht 
Uw *nd tatoftaltontl Trortfcs. Unavtaoritatf rtpwfeclfeft o? cfctrilMstfoA of m& AIA* 0*svm*fti, <* **y portion of a m*y m$vti m **vm cfK **d 
ctfmln** pw\*ifc**k *nd »i& be pr<#*cyted to tfcn maximum extent pe&sfctt yncfcr to* Uw* Th* document was Bfoducos by AJA loSwsra tt 13 3125 on 
«»4fi»04uMtfCfelrAte i000iiS5a7 t w^hexerts on 5/(8^2005,intijsnenor re^«. w 
^ , 
PAGE Z 
Xl^coipmgacBmert ^^MLb^Imdm.iwim toflracfiadl 
§ 3,3 The Contractor shall aciueve Substantial Gomplztxcz of the enttre Work not later thw 2i& ^ J 5 fr°& the date 
of comffleacetaenu or as follows; 
I n a c c o r d a n c e vlfch EadfadLblt A 
PAGE 3 
| $.1.1 Based apoa Application for ?*ymeat subletted to the AiohUoofrgaSBg fay the Contractor asad Certificates 
for Ptyacat issued by the ,A^^<^M^o^^c.tor, lbs Owner ahaU make progress payments OB aceoojat of the 
Contract Sum to the Contractor as provided belcw aad elsewhere in the Contract Documents 
§ 5,1,3 Provided tot aa Agpifcafioa for Payment is received by the Aflritoe^-QasBg got later than tte Thirtieth day 
of a moath, the 0 waer shall mato payment to tbe Contractor not later than the Thirtieth day of the following 
jtsomh. If an A#pUca&m for Payment is received by tbe AffthifoafcOwQer after the application date fixed above, 
payment shall be made by the Qwaer not later than Thirty ( 2£ ) days after the Msfaitaos >Q&tfit receives the 
Application for Faysoeiit 
§ 5*14 Each Application for Payxseat sbsll be baaed on the roost recent schedule of values subtnitted by tbe 
Contractor is accordance with tbe Contract Documents. Tbe schedule of values shaft allocate the entire Contract 
Sum amoflg tbe various portions of the "Work The schedule of values shall be prepared is such form and supported 
by such data to substaatiate]i$ accuracy a$ the Architect pwpey may reqtdre. This schedule, unless objected to by 
the Agehi^HQaaBL shall be tased as a basis for reviewing the Contractor's Applications for Payment 
,1 Add, upon Substantial Completion of the WoA, a sum sufficient to increase the total paymeats to the 
full amount of the Coi&act Sam* less such asaotxsis as the Agoteteot^hSSSt $ba& detename for 
iircoinpfete Work, retainage applicable to sooh work and unsettled claims; md 
PAGE 4 
2 a fioai Certificate for Paymsnt has bees issued by the AruhitiH)t£ogtractor and a C of O has b$e$ 
issued by Wasatcfr Couatv and the Wasatch Coraty Fire fiistr>c^> 
( )gOTOM 
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tftts t% Mslin^ the cc^e t& j ioimefts that tit hss thoroughly 
iilr^ h ih* Wo& a£TMC. tbjto in pe contrast "Canfesdet " 
maijon and iwi»tipt^;«xf &o| upon swsmo* or rgpje 
ferfgas Stat this agratmek s p a s In *dsMm \o aij &ti\m 'a\ 
xt $& qfl&mrtpmi^mim Woffc io te performed **—*-
Ad )h» *te and Ha& tenSa^zad Hmstf with &e local 
in$jj*n* and ecmeKbns craw $ia antf no% Owner of sjr/ <tocrqp 
i^sftrfc r a v t p ^ if te<^mtjt# Contract 
Peadtn |&gijae*t*]Bg 
pwenta thai ht w 
Siiuctosai j^ ans? -
te&tacfuf af plana. 
Oftisr 
f.2 Prtof fo c&mmemefji oe worn; Contractor ahafl M aft ssmpLsa. I&is, dawlhgs, eaii 
connadian w*lh ^s w tk : to$t #Drt#a* tf seme fe ratf jtifef rf Ms rngponsBAf h 
*peciti$#fon$. ABjmessen^elf aid d$!?v#y costs far saMfe ew drawings iumiatfad by 
sanasijtg #s- 7 
Sfi plans, apacfficaftn*, addenda and 
thai fca i* arfeing Into this contact in 
any, fhat ma# to® been made fiy Otfner 
rftHWtS, S any/ be&seen parties, and fos 
Sy g*8cufmg .(he canttasl im Conusor 
under tfto me waf^ }» to b« petfom^d 






V^ J^ t?« mqtsrsments of lha dfSWgs srtf 
ictor £ # be oad by Contf actor. 
[ srdars of «ny fnt ik auihonty kssnng on lh& ConCrB^ Df' iWf ^vs M j » j c a i « i cc«^y with !e? jafe, ^tBwnae^ nites, mgulsfeis a« 
p9dbrraano» ol $k*zkc'mi&thistcni^ct-jndWngfW na(fenfedbimp»$tfGns. -TtejContttcfcrshs2 sectire r»d psy fer 3§ p^m i^s, 
fess 2?K3 licenses fjnemn^ ^ ^ ^ t o ^ ^ ^ f 0 6 I s p^11*^. pe^ssirisn bsmcad^ft, s m j use Dermitst itagmat\ etc) j^4$sary for the 
co^pfetfOn tf }Ht Wsk? ft Contractor sfoute fi»l to |sy any tint, fca*\$g4 ^mi?8 t?f *k^$ mt$m$ to b e ^ d by the pr&fstsns or tms 
paagjtoh, O n^oe msjf, at fjia spfe, p«y Ihe s«n4 arnihbs cost thamoi $hs& tje|<l@chmfe6 l^ pm the centred turn. 
3, U A S l l i T Y l ^ U . ^ jgsaffii. WRK£RS'pOypa$^T!DM 
wdsnes ot to^iy afc J ^ « A :orn^ens3t«^ ^ Ur334, The csf fetas $h^i pwlcfe lor, 
A, A #jafanUfc& H*fw (30) % s f>oiiC5 ^ 0*ft5r prior lo^ncelisgon $ any policy. Un$aage sw^ as "will endeavor to wi l i ^ ^ 4%y$ 
mtum rtotioe" »«3' L btit tailRft <^B m^8 JBU^ ks^c^ $^ail im^sse W ofclteatifrq or Ji^illty of a«y kin^ upon the ccmpanyt fU 
*5**t* »r fep#WarJUtJve&* - fe yn$ec€ptab}£ sh^^KXJ^ t>$ stndten. 
C toocwtwia <nrf St^c^mafeffOfiS^to^con Stsrt«kaf stuffiS^r Cree^ a*at*ft3ur^ DCK, 
^ ^ : _ . initial 
0. Cowefcr«M t f t tamie|p*rastcomWOkiwkwQw®f%*8*itffetenfwwdtt^ctetion*!»war«&dy«$>rsaWpofcussnh 
^ appropriate t m d ^ ^ j ]• I 
£ A &*tomen$ thai #£ C ^ J & c m 1mmK* )S primary FP «M«*t* t#t»2 wlti ^ insurfcwp purchased fey trwr Own$r #><## Owe?* 
, /x*war shaK imMfo 'W**l 1&ce *n# effe&S rf'fiwrf rfpoRcy of $w«nc* imcfer ^ wort**' aw^ftwtfgr* ^ of fch* State at Uii 
is 
33 fn tne ewsrii tf o ^ k c r i f ira^std (araaSaJtav or potokte'* feitee ta obism pppar insurant owmgft, Q w w may, bat ti^ »xH tie 
«taenw^(t^iW^ 
Owner, 
ir*y* tawom tf* & $ wr awl 1or #*er goad ^rtf vstofrM con^ii«mtb\ tho t^otipt «*ntf su&ciercy tf 
fact IS & sgtWj thai fe]tfjo*ing p i s t o n $ha« sppfrf to fte fnderfeting towam the Contraoicr and 8 * 
42 ConWtttof «W**£>liidbmr^^ dfi^»ndindhc^^h^fn^fe^ ftg (towasid tf of 0ym?$ effete, tgastfc « d ^npfoyiu to&n srtf agamit 
any ^ a t c b ^ . ^ m tih^ses,"" toasajk £WK4 ^ g ^ . - . * * * iB*P|W^!*!? *fl*«fi^Q *uomsr^ifts«d Bi^MtfotrnMbQliom cfefttagt 
or dno&*« fc t w p i ^ £ r . ' ^ te or ,8^ ng^ iJ# ds^i trf pessom { i ^ K ^ g She cpo«s> agatt* 3&5 entpfe^s of Owmr or 
Cantraaior); any c a a r a ^ | d 4 ^ sny aa of ©miss&n ^ pyittw&r rented. <finse^or-iri(S^cly, fe Contractor's'wo* mdsr this contract,, 
A, Ttejwfonrcratf 
• 8. The p m e m ^ < k « p ^ - y a r v 6* ftSfsF&t^ *fe&. eapfoysss, Of p a ^ s 3c l%vi^ 3s pennfcsiav axpr«s«*d &' implied, on &• 
ftboyi tHe premise d$&Q*tm. 
i t Gwatfof trfhft *«**& #h( fafcraa; state, artf ]6c£ p* tm,,.«9cW s w f ^ <^$, 
.ronpersatfan ^ ^ f e^^s?^ aPi^fi^fe to ^ e j^^s^nce of fif^si 'contfjawJL^> C^w^ w^c&or L 
every n ator a *#&h my p- t r f l p ^ ^ e ^ ^ W ^ f i t t & i i ^ •Bjfa^ivpm\jlwt m 
to jjirart; or ^ ttJn n t n i m o ^ t e M ^ Qcnracfr ahc Osvn^ 4 g Coo^acdorsjted fail to 
pewiisor (ses mitradto b^pdid by tf« p^vifiio4 « W P«SPP^ ^ ^ W . * *& ^ 
corr^ wsafton' acts 6nd mftm* 
p*f «H texas, Ikensas, im$ and jiwt^ts Of 
{or ether things used M the patfcimsrsqB of 
sny tax (txdydsig ^ fop^rt^  tsxe4 fc^ose, 
pary &e SBmeJsnd the CD^ mamof jhafiba 
8.< 
8.2 
6. t Ocwfcwkr agiws w i p « i snema ^ f a s js? pwscaje jhR WoHc £%sr% ^ nd ^ cwly ^ IH to perform any prolan of Ms contact, iha 
Ow? ,^ sftar tfm^ttm <fe *^ «^sn noltj&lto ^ e hm&ti®, ^rt;'WRtaut (^afc&-te sw sfher mmec^  ?fe msy h^e, make good such 
d£fic&f?c«$ «md SJtiR ae^iitl te'<»$i ^ $n&d fcojij fee|aymcms fesn or thst^jsr dim tte pnteetor, Contractor $te& cokp&&& «Rb Ote 
0%»»r«rtd othsf"^ra j^^K}S0 :«^ conti^ors i^ csdi, ' ^ ' O T R -p&ttdpste in th© prepaT^on of copcfirsiad 
aetMuftig In 3mas rf p$$ittiav spe^«ca% i»*?g qw « * ^ ^ «w Ov«nsr ^  ^ «ueh rntffsrgnce, f 
7,. C^» ITaACTOR^^U^TE^^ 
me One** artf ^ m s ^ ^ucji cfedtos as jaay be]ne |^saiy to e» psompt and iffioiGrtt p^srmgncs of (his agreement Contractor $hs& not 
e i i^o f t the^TOJp^W-rW Arty ta^o^esiofthe Corit^ ctorwho is agucbeci by Oww 10 te 
Jnconpsta^ t, tifeAife^y,' bre^ibl e, er (^ rvwae'wirap$)SKiory JUI^ l » imms^sfefy r^ ro^ l ffcm the work aritf rgpjanad « $ dmefy manner. 
CocSaSw $Ml jafeeii fiksoo^ft safety, p^cauf(sor|s^ respscl t» his Wort, tetek comol^  wJlh aft seisty measuras ix f^tned tjy 0SH4 and 
vfftn ^  ^ptob^p fe^st hnfeiano&i^esM -ftfufewp s ^ -ondB^  <^  any p^jf| ai/tlioriiy ^ the safely of persons and prnpany... 
to omvfaQ «rt ^ s Wbi^ , ins Contrartor s ^ lafe r^ cja^ary prscauii^ s to pmtaet property the imi&&d *&& m oth«r uadss imm damags 
fmsl ?ccep+*src^  d ©e W p pmj&i Com^cfijr sftaf pfc^ ect 8^ «c«m proper i^ipm Imty BfeitiQ w\ oi his vWc Ownsr my &t»dy any 
de?3iifi by ConUpctoq ii^iiFtfs 'i&i£gwpkt and fe W ^nasf %^£ b& ;dedae4tf Jrom" (teIContracf price 
0;&QCVmn& tniJ-Ss^i^TrSi^ntOe&fe^ScW S^rf^^^tiimS^vai'' 'Crwrftr mSxl<~n£LnOOC iaiinl 
5.1 Ctatfactor &W* («wk Sfe jffc&asaiy fcofe r^ qMirerf tor te&pteikst or his *?ofc tafcjtirig, fcut oft limited to the <*fic*irvg - powm generator, 
tfacirlca? catfc; temjWv f$$foei such u pm& M ^ tooes, sis&r meter*, &&*t$; ^ ffolAng, ?od$te< t>dtf;toe&( tamp*^ da*fce$, 
pyrtpfc s^ptaritoi, pamr|$ii, etc & 0 « ^ e v i ^ s i f ^ ^ &***, CMwjtor igmss jo mifttxm Ovuw for Contetoft prorata 
usage otsim* 
i&e«ot CooWctorigrH5 
> tymUl loan tx otherwise, J 
«H&kich use s^tjbe at i » t 
iaCoJTtmt^ ampioy^s or pfop«ti 
,„i use of any tf ihe Owners egusdmanrt, $caf**i<&xii #£#**" sppt*arxm on lb* 
J t itt of Conlcacior ami £ftsi Comr&fcr has* sattsl&tf himself as to &e conation 
I Owner agft&cla&m el avery nstsk arismg torn the nee thsrasf todu#v$, &A 
ilolhei*. 
te lurried tirc^lhaj 
,_ . . . haachecteftf 
hoi* in ftieperfa/ntspce o f i u 
rjsph wHftm ? 2 hours ^ r 
4i nectfesary mrtsW* w M £ # «KI oftar^ews whfcjh 
to avoid <fciay to <ht papcttflafl of the prqte as a t 
eqy*p?fle# && owe itsma p&shased or to! fee pwphsjsi 
anticipated susptera tejed? *jnd (he aggregate v#ue df 
Conimcfctf in the 
«qtitpm«^ and other tens *ntefc jsft&tf be cfeqused'-fcr the peffarwca of flte 
Corftscfer lubr* a feijof ' w p i m torn whom Gonirastor proposes & pgrshsss 
ft be tequtterf by Certii^ efc* in !ha prtomtsnea of this agiemefll togetfw «tftt 
*ff sash mewtets, eqt&Knent dtokher tatma mto he ff^afiabfe h sufRcM Itms 
CortteJtor eisR $ u ^ t ie CH?nef, if requfest^ s ?/jfgsn ne^  ctm met^ i^ 
^ the peHormartoe o? this figms^mi shewing the names of (he suppfe* or 
mstsiials p a s s e d k b be^popaied from each such suppler Conjrecux 
euchttERi»^bederiw«i}totw^ 
INs prefect Co t^ractofs ttlireilopnlsh «ny or all of the informato feqaired to 
datw«f by Owwrj^aJ! tonstt^m abre^di o( 9h agrcemeftL 
ftmjia&*! of <**? ee|er^ftanSv er rnmfy rec^^d by w | 
10.3 DeSlvefydM^efii^l 
^jpmefrtteat 
TZJ houn pftor noUce to me Owarifot (fefiwry c* miierfalj end e<^nnert lu to* 
«8 . to . f t e t e&^- roh^n t t sta»».-end yrt^cfoft of sa^ d m^enaa y d 
jaqaMfty awd-cott of ^<fer^acl^f .Q^mMi mbt rescpf^^e, nor vektexpp 
11,1 On 3 d$y pasfs Cmfrktorfjet Hz own agpens* andfeist, sh«H si all iime kes^ the $cb$kh frne from accumtdaffoir of wasls irtaiaftsf ot 
nfcjsish caiiserf or pteptedpy Me made. Upcsii connate^ ^ CoftWtart woKjhe $hrft*a«Ss o*n expa^e.snd cosl ternavs all rubk$\ 
suiplu&meteriaL tofe Mffof<Srgt 2M sspbrnert g^ay fern the joEsiia. $nd\bs premises; afwt be Jen towmbtorfcr lis e i^wa^ent tffiiew 
oih®i^ 4» ipedftei by feo^r. fr» ^e event ^  dJ^ie as to #* msponaUtty for feiwaJ p nibbfs.^  ton ?hs jc^slie, Ow>«r may mmo^ 
the nifeh and dtaga We cost t?>emof to Jlhe vaooy^ <W&GS>fi fespo*i5B2ie ^9mfor k» %^ r^ ticrt as me b # w , at his sds dhoralm, 
$na«l ^etermim toDenkJ«rif such »noc«Spn ehi{befa*Mng o* mCtmmztim. 
121 There sh?f< he w ^ 
^m& TO CONTRACT 
»!or(ter i& (his Contract ^ es^slreecf ID \mlhg between the p&fcs Hareio 
s^dsiocv ton the bwner <or anr change oxd^ Ihdtnsjf I 
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r^ gH to cercei tMijeowacl l^ cntnsstor shjil not 4 ^ * P®* s^cofOTd the ^ c 4 af tote rakrscl withotn ^ e
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jibe^ms <&t Anj servfep .«m:Cdn&sctor- <ee$tv»tfljr #to$nopa ConVsctor sna^J provide seivfce te by 12.00 
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i ' 1 « f : I 1 I ?fi!W 
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aftali $a)&&}act i& any 0«n fcite mt«mtfon asl**tn*nt or otfcsr ar«omb«mee. 
)IL pDND^&AUTHC^ZgDtee^IOSS: {Mat w f * ^ f a j 6 f a } 
i r 1 When ^ ppboifafo, C a k s t c f c ^ ' f y p ^ Owner 3 s^cmwcfc band ami Blxr antfflateaal WW *#*a an £10} days of the dsta mat Afc 
wm*&aKsc$ad 
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DEER CRSST PROJECT ~ ADDENDUM UB" 
CERTIFICATE OF INSURANCE REQUIREMENTS 
icrtificite Hoiclsr and Warned 
rtdmtiowJ Insureds: 
L.CS& Payable (Mortgages) 
Descriptor of Operations' 
Project Hme & location, 
£ Cancellation clause: 
Gftwr at Rtbiiity limits; 
rjratessianaf (fc+0) liability-
'liorfceis Compensation 
AtJ omobfte Uabtlfty 
Copies to be maBed to 
O w Cre$i Associates I, LC 
Sail Gabriel* CA 51776 
' itetrCrest^feterAssociafon^ I C< GramS Harvest Ventures, LLC, Utah Ausp»aous ventures, L LC; 
Cornucopia Crast Vsntuw, L I C Ovnamic Holdings Corporation; Angela C. Sabelia, individually 
Dynamic finance Corporation 
Deer Ciwt project (sla rssat & housing development) legated in Wasatch County (east of Part* City; ^ to 
Deer Cresi Project, WasateVSummit Counties, Uteh 
Required 3D-day& written rt',l<u* to CentficaJe HoHei and Named Additional Insureds 
D Pofcjf is primary & rron-contributory 
Q Poi^ cy shall mduiB Contractual Liability w&ragfc 
Q * - Waiver of Sxibfogabon in t a w of cerfificste holder 
Genera! Aggregate rartt 
Q $20,000,000 Q $5,000,000 f j $2t0CT 001 f 1 S^  000 O0G 
Eaeh Octu/renca limit 
0*5,000,000 B$2.00Q,OOr I IMOOOOOO 
Personal & Adverting injury limit 
0*5000,000 - £$2,000,300 f ] $ W 0 0 O O55CG.CC0 
Products and Completed Operations Aggregate 
D $5,000,000 Q 82,000.000 Q $1,000,000 
Fire Damage (&tf one fire) 
fvledlca- expanse (any one per son) 
DsducSbte amount per occurrence 
fej $ 500,000 
P S 10,000 
s 
Policy Aggregate limit; 
Q $5,000,000 D $1,000,000 0**500000 
Deductible amount oar occurrence 





Q Owned £ non-o^ned/hirad vehicle coverage 
5 _ „ . Dsduc&fe amount per occurrence 
L
 0-est Associates i , l C 
8 -"syBW, Suite 200 
W W 
L^jr-snts and S«ttirt9iun8ten\0*?kiop\Scott Stsr&fcsr StufftSPvsr Z'*&* ad^encten DOC irtifca? 
/I: 
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Granum Partners, a California limited Partnership ("Guarantor"), whose 
address is Post Office Box 2460, Saratoga, California, as a material inducement 
to and in consideration of Deer Crest Associates I, tC ("Owner") entering into a 
construction contract, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as 
Exhibit A, with Silver Creek Development Group, LLC ("Builder") for the 
construction of certain town homes, further identified as Deer Crest Townhomes, 
building #5 (10513,10515 and 10517 N. Lake View Lane, Heber City, UT 84032) 
and any future amendments for additional work at Deer Crest ("Project"), within 
that certain development known as Deer Crest Town Homes in Deer Valley. 
Utah, guarantees and promises to and for the benefit of Owner that Builder shall 
complete construction of the project for a price not to exceed $1,588,926.45. if 
the price exceeds $1,588,926.45. Buiider will be responsible for payment to 
Buiider for cost overruns. For purposes of this Guaranty, construction of the 
Project shall be complete upon (i) Owner receipt of Certificate of Occupancy from 
Wasatch County (ii) Wasatch County Fire District and (it?) any Owner punchlist 
items Such construction shall include supplying materials and supervising 
subcontractors supplied by Owner]], but shall not include (t) permits (ii) taxes (tii) 
utility connections (iv) outdoor spa's. The Guarantor further guarantees and 
promises that upon completion of construction of the Project, no liens of any kind 
shall encumber title to the town homes identified above as Building 5, as a result 
of construction performed by the Builder, if said hens are encumbering the 
property then Guarantor will hold harmless, defend and indemnify Owner for any 
Page 1 of 2 
aftd 3$ d^ma^es and attorney ijejs^ s and cost inoijrad by pm$r fn removing $aid 
fian. TheC?u&fantor expressly fc&es not guarantee (hatthfe Project vwlf be free of 
Item of spy kind that erwumbdrj 








Guaramtoit , Robert M, Graraim 
conditions of this Gu^r|«nt^ 
title to the town] home$ mr some reason other 
excising 
(guarantor for aifl tsfaims 
is General Partner of Guarantor represents and 
fhfc Guaranty against Guarantor, Owner 
being guaranteed by 
warrants to Owner that he ha3s the capacity and authority w bind Guarantor to the dthori 
Jb& Guaranty ® made] fnltib State of Cafftfmto and!the rights and 
obfigatlpnsj of the parties hereto Uistl be interpreted, construed, and enforced in 
acc r^damcfe with ths laws of trie prate of California.] This Guaranty ahafl be sofefy 
i 
$ubjtjc£jio the jurisdiction of the ^ l ifomia courts Injand fox fhe County of Santa 
I ' 
Clara, $taip of| California 
Gudr^nfor's ofaftgattor^ u^er this Guaranty £hal! be {binding upon 
Guarav($af$ it/ccessors. 
Dated fAis ^briday, May 36, 2005 ( 
Granule ted Partnership 
Robert H. 
pBQB 2 Of 2 
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i ski trafl to match 
dUTOOOR SPA: Sjpja tub and tub tnsWiaticfrt Is excluded from the 
ppce but CoMraotarr p i provide nea^saiy ^P&csal etetMcd outlet and 
plumbing for spa fqr future tub insialteiiori by f ownftome buyer, 
CLOSET DOOR: Md to master btdrbwc^okte. 
RUNCHUSt:Buaqirbl^&f7Puric>ilist; extract price to Include the 
fallowing items; j ; ! 
a R&pour cdnenets driveways for 10495 & 1pS07 R Lake View tms 
Dr. and install frcait floor dmtns. | 
Fkifeh lower comjrete fou mJation waite fadr 
building #8 &#? J 
Replace top mowing to wmdkw in living fx 
Frost steir to living room to be re-eecumd 
Route tower wcjojl bl ister and stem 
Fix siam on floor 
Re-secure haodlml!^  
R&patot walls mm water as needed. 
Miscellaneous Making In garage ^  
Nail carpet down in lower closet 
Re-secure rubber urtiwr mamioor in gars* 
Re-insi**!} heat lab* and m the v$m any j 
J wifl become payable and apjrfied to future j 
ENTRY WALKWAY Sidewaik entiy to have i 
determined tew weeks prior to pouring, ; ^  
ADDENDUM A THJJfllNK. Change the Mmne buitefing completion to ^ • 
qn our before Feb^u^ry 28, 2000. - w ^ W J e r ?**-<« * 4 4 U A ^/y^ 
APPUANCES: AH jaopliafices, fireplace, HVJAC, gemge door 7 r 
motor/openers anq ^ ther related equipment *prraf*t?e$ shell 
<jommer>ce as of ttW date of safe of ekcb unit j 
GONTJNGENCY; Landlord to pre-approve requests for CorrSngenc^s 
JJ1NAL PAYMENT:] bwner to hold finkl pmyhknl until Owner is in 
receipt of (1) a certificate erf occupancy is reoejved for the permits, ill) 
sign offe ffom othe^ijoverning authorities i&: roe department utilities) 
and p ) completer] i f Owner punchfest, W awl The final payment shall 






r heat tape is required 
>uiktmg #4, 
i decorative finish to be 
fni&fc:- Owi«rj 




1. O UTOOOR SPA* Spa tub and tub InstaSatfcm is excluded from the 
pnca but Contractor will preside necessary special etedncai outtet and 
plumbing for spa for future tub \miallatson by Townhome buyer, 
2. CLOSET DOOR: Add to master bedroom closets. 
3. PUNCHUST: Building #6 & #7 Punchfist Contract pnee to Include the 
fallowing items; 
a* Re-pour concrete drfve^vays for 10495 & 10507 K Lafce View Lane 
Or and install front ftoor drains 
b Finish lower concrete foundation walls feeing ski traif to match 
building #6 & #7* . . 
c. Replace top molding to window In Hving room 
d First stair to living room to be re-secured 
e, Route tower wood banister and stain 
f Fix stain on floor 
$. JSe-secure handrails 
ru I2^5alrrtwa!l$frsmwatar as nested, 
l, Miscellaneous cauffclng in garage 
j . Hail carpet dewn in lower closet ^  
k, Re-seoure rubber ynd#r *r*andoer in garage. 
I Re-instaJI heat tape and in the vent &ny new heat tape is required 
wil become payable and applied to future building #4, 
A, ENTRY WALKWAY: StdewaP< entry to have a decorative finish to be 
determined two weeks pnor to pounng. 
5. ADDENDUM A TIMELINE: Change the ttmedne buMing completion to 
on our b&hre February 28,2000. 
6. APPLIANCES: M appliances, fiiBplace, HVAC, garage door 
motor/openers and other related equipment warranties shall 
commence as of the date of sate of each unit 
7. CONTINGENCY: Landlord to pre-approve requests for Contingencies 
8. FINAL PAYMENT: Owner to hokJ final payment until Owner is in 
receipt of <i) a certificate of occupancy is received for the permits, (ii) 
sign offe from other governing auihor&es (&* fire department, utilities) 
and (iji) completion c# Owner puachU$tf If any. The final payment shall 
be the equivalent of 10% of the total contract price 
tn&ste,. Os^cr I I ccrafl&oto] ^ ^ 
J^ilver ! 
i ^ e v ^ t a p m e n t One-up* LLC— 
CHANGE ORDER 
fTQ (OONTRACTOR). 
SUver Creek Custom Hornet 
p H & N G E ORDER MO. 
[Date of Change Order 
|jofc>Ni»nb«r 
[Contract Dale 
1 Job Locat^aa^ 
3/13/20061 
Deer CmlBLDO #3 
&20/200S 
10517 No, UkevlswLn j 
I YOU ARE "akeCTED TO MAKE THEFOLLQWHG CHANGES IN THIS CONTRACT- "" _ _._J 
1 
J f L 1 
I 
-
Raise foundation up to 3* as per Scott Carlson 
Front and back of foundation mdudmg engineering, j 
Site preparation, forming of watls and columns, concrete and steeff j 
Pump, additional plumbmg costs to raise system, j 





I *- , 
I . 
IMMNVMMMMMMaMMaMMaMWMHflMNaMN^^ 
\_Oost ' j 
% 48,000.00 j 
[Contract Time Wlfl Be - Increased / Decreased by: 
/ Days' 1 0 
IQngina! Contract Pnse 
iPrevfiousy Authorized Change Orders 
$1,588,724 531 
$768 25! 
Ne^Csmptetfcn Date* N/A New Contract Pnce $1.589,482.781 
ACCEPTED: The above prices and specifications 
are satisfactory and are hereby accepted AB wo?k 
to be done under same terms and concffocms as original 
contract unless otrjgrw&e stipulated 
IThrs Change Ordef $46,000.00 
|New Contract Price $1,635,492 ?S 
SUBCONTRACTOR: ~ 




IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEER CREST ASSOCIATES, L.C, a Utah 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
SILVER CREEK DEVELOPMENT GROUP, 
L.L.C., 
Defendant. 
RULING AND ORDER 
Case No. 070500487 
Judge Derek P. Pullan 
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Silver Creek Development Group, L.L.C.'s 
("Silver Creek") Motion to Dismiss. Silver Creek filed the motion and supporting memorandum on 
January 9, 2008. Plaintiff Deer Crest Associates, L.C. ("Deer Crest") filed a memorandum in opposition 
on January 23. 2008. Silver Creek filed a reply memorandum on February 1, 2008. Silver Creek filed a 
notice to submit for decision on February 4, 2008. Neither party has requested a hearing. 
Silver Creek argues that Deer Crest waived its right to litigate this matter by having failed to 
make a timely demand for arbitration under the contract. In the alternative, Silver Creek argues that the 
case should be dismissed and the parties ordered into arbitration. 
Deer Crest argues that "whether a condition to arbitrability has been fulfilled"—in this case a 
timely demand for arbitration—is for the arbitrator to decide, not me court. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-
1 
107(3). Deer Crest asserts that a majority of federal and state courts have ruled that the timeliness of a 
demand for arbitration is for the arbitrator to decide. 
Having considered the arguments of the parties, the Court denies Silver Creek's motion to 
dismiss. Under the contract, timely demand for arbitration is arguably a "condition precedent to 
arbitrability5' and therefore an issue for the arbitrator to decide, not the court. 
The parties are ordered to arbitrate the dispute in accordance with the terms of their contract. 
Pursuant to section 78-3 la-108(7), these judicial proceedings are stayed pending completion of the 
arbitration. 
DATED this S~~ day of February, 
*n 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 070500487 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail ERIC G EASTERLY 
Attorney PLA 
PO Box 681238 
PARK CITY, UT 84068-1238 
Mail RANDALL K SPENCER 
Attorney DEF 
3 3 01 N UNIVERSITY AVE 
PROVO UT 84 6 04 
Dated this # day of tyft\Al)(C 
Page 1 ( last! 
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EXHIBIT C 
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION 
Case No. 77 110 00099 08 SUBR 
In the Matter of the Arbitration between 
Deer Crest Associates I, L.C. 
Claimant, 
v. 
Silver Creek Development Group, LLC, 
Respondent. 
Respondent Silver Creek Development Group, LLC ("Silver Creek") has filed a motion 
to dismiss this Arbitration on the ground that the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") 
lacks jurisdiction to arbitrate this matter because Claimant Deer Crest Associates I, L.C. ("Deer 
Crest") failed to file its demand for arbitration within thirty days of when the dispute arose. For 
the reasons set forth below, the Arbitrator grants Silver Creek's motion. 
Background. 
Deer Crest is the owner of certain real property located in Wasatch County, Utah referred 
to as the Deer Crest Townhouses. 
On July 1, 2005, Deer Crest and Silver Creek entered into an AIA Al 01-1997 Standard 
Form of Agreement Between Owner and Contractor ("Contract") wherein Silver Creek agreed to 
construct Building 5 and finish punch list items on Buildings 6 and 7 of the Deer Crest 
Townhouses in return for payment of $1,588,926,45, before adjustments. 
RULING ON RESPONDENT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
On February 5, 2007, Deer Crest terminated the Contract on the ground that Silver Creek 
failed to timely complete the work required under the Contract. Thereafter, Deer Crest hired a 
new contractor to complete the work. That work was completed in early 2008, at a cost in excess 
of the Contract Sum under the Contract. 
Article 8.1.2 of the Contract provides that: "The General Conditions are the 1997 edition 
of the General Conditions of the Contract for Construction, AIA Document A201-1997." Article 
8,1.6 also identifies "Addenda [sic] B: General Conditions of the Contract & Insurance 
Requirements" as a Contract Document. 
Subparagraph 4.4.1 of AIA A201-1997 provides that: "Claims, including those alleging 
an error or omission by the Architect... shall be referred to initially to the Architect for 
decision. An initial decision by the Architect shall be required as a condition precedent to 
mediation, arbitration or litigation of all Claims between the Contractor and Owner arising prior 
to the date final payment is due, unless 30 days have passed after the Claim has been referred to 
the Architect with no decision having been rendered by the Architect." Subparagraph 4.6.1 
provides in part that: "Any Claim arising out of or related to the Contract. . . shall after decision 
by the Architect or 30 days after submission of the Claim to the Architect, be subject to 
arbitration." Subparagraph 4.6.3 provides that: UA demand for arbitration shall be made within 
the time limits specified in Subparagraphs 4,4,6 and 4.6.1 as applicable, and other cases within a 
reasonable time after the Claim has arisen, and in no event shall it be made after the date when 
institution of a legal proceeding based on such Claim would be barred by the applicable statute 
of limitations as determined pursuant to Paragraph 13.7." Subparagraph 4.4.6 provides that a 
demand for arbitration must be filed within 30 days after the Architect renders his final decision. 
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Subparagraph 4.6.1 allows a party to commence arbitration if the Architect has not rendered a 
final decision within thirty days after submission of the Claim to the Architect. 
Paragraph 19.1 of Addenda [sic] B provides in pertinent part: 
Ail claims, disputes and other matters in question between the parties to this 
Agreement arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the breach thereof, 
shall be decided by arbitration in accordance with the Construction Industry 
Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association unless the parties 
mutually agree otherwise. Notice of the demand for arbitration shall be filed in 
writing with the other party to this Agreement and with the American Arbitration 
Association. The demand shall be made within thirty (30) days after the claim, 
dispute or other matter in question has arisen. In no event shall the demand for 
arbitration be made after the date when institution of legal proceedings based 
upon such claim, dispute, or other matter in questions [sic] would be barred by 
the applicable statute of limitations. 
In November, 2007, Deer Crest commenced Civil No. 070500487 in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court, in and for Wasatch County, State of Utah, by filing a complaint styled Deer Crest 
Associates I} LC} v. Silver Creek Development Group, LLC ("Lawsuit"). After being served in 
the action, Silver Creek filed a motion to dismiss the Lawsuit arguing that Deer Crest's alleged 
failure to file a demand for arbitration within thirty days after Deer Crest's claim arose barred its 
claim. In the alternative, Silver Creek requested that the Court dismiss the Lawsuit and order the 
parties to arbitrate their dispute. Deer Crest opposed Silver Creek's motion, but asserted that 
whether the demand for arbitration was timely filed was a "condition to arbitrability" which was 
a matter for the arbitrator to decide, 
On February 5, 2008, the Honorable Judge Derek P. Pullan denied Silver Creek's Motion 
to Dismiss, Judge Pullan held that the issue of whether the demand for arbitration was timely 
filed was arguably "a condition precedent to arbitrability" which, under Utah Code Ann. § 78-
3la-107(3), was a matter for the arbitrator to decide. On that ground, Judge Pullan referred the 
matter to arbitration and stayed the Lawsuit pending completion of the arbitration. 
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On March 3, 2008, Deer Crest filed its demand for arbitration with the AAA and served a 
copy upon Silver Creek's counsel The Arbitrator was appointed. The Arbitrator and counsel 
for the parties participated in a preliminary hearing on June 11, 2008. At that hearing, Silver 
Creek's counsel advised the Arbitrator that Silver Creek intended to file a motion to dismiss. 
The Arbitrator set deadlines agreed to by counsel for the parties for the filing of that motion and 
related briefing. Silver Creek timely filed its motion which is now before the Arbitrator. 
Analysis. 
The threshold issue before the Arbitrator is whether Deer Crest timely filed its demand 
for arbitration. In order to address that issue, the Arbitrator must first aetermine the deadline for 
filing the demand under the terms of the Contract Documents. As set forth above, 
Subparagraphs 4.4.6,4.6.1 and 4.6.3 of the AIA A201-1997 General Conditions require that a 
demand be made within: (1) thirty days after the Architect makes a final decision; (2) thirty days 
after the Architect fails to timely make a final decision on a dispute; or (3) within a reasonable 
time. Paragraph 19.1 of Addenda [sic] B, however, requires the demand to be filed within thirty 
days after the "claim, dispute or other matter in question has arisen." 
Deer Crest argues that the Arbitrator should consider these provisions together to 
conclude that the thirty7 day requirement of Paragraph 19.1 is not applicable. After reviewing 
these provisions, however, the Arbitrator has determined that Paragraph 19.1 of Addenda [sic] B 
provides for a different arbitration scheme than do Subparagraphs 4.4.6, 4.6.1 and 4.6.3 of the 
AIA 201-1997 General Conditions. The Arbitrator concludes that only one of the two schemes, 
not both, can apply. When parties agree to an addendum to anothet document, they generally 
intend that the addendum change or modify that document. In this case, the parties agreed to 
adopt Addenda [sic] B which changes or modifies the terms of the AIA A201-1997 General 
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Conditions. That the parties intended this result is supported by the fact that the AIA A201 -1997 
General Conditions are form provisions, whereas Addenda [sic] B addresses many of the same 
issues as the AIA A201-1997 General Conditions and was specially crafted by the parties 
themselves. Therefore, the Arbitrator concludes that where the provisions of Paragraph 19.1 
differ from those of the AIA A201-1997 General Conditions, they supersede them. In this case, 
Paragraph 19.1 supersedes Subparagraphs 4:4.6, 4,6.1 and 4.6.3 of the AIA A201-1997 General 
Conditions. 
Having determined that Paragraph 19.1 of Addenda [sic] B governs the arbitration of 
disputes under the Contract Documents, the Arbitrator now considers whether Deer Crest 
satisfied the requirement that the demand for arbitration be filed within tcthirty days after the 
claim, dispute or other matter is question has arisen/' 
Deer Crest argues that its claim arose only after it learned the extent of its damages in 
February of 2008. That is when Ferran Construction, the completion contractor, finished its 
work and provided Deer Crest with its final invoice for that work. Deer Crest points out that its 
contract with Ferran Construction was a cost plus a fee contract. For that reason, the total 
amount owed to Ferran Construction under that contract could not be determined until Ferran 
Construction finished the work. Silver Creek, on the other hand, argues that the claim arose on 
February 5, 2007, the date that Deer Crest terminated Silver Creek. To resolve this issue under 
Utah law, the Arbitrator looks for guidance to pronouncements of Utah courts regarding the 
accrual of a cause of action for purposes of statutes of limitations analysis. 
In S & G, Inc. v. Intermountain Power Agency, 913 P. 2d 735, (Utah 1996), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated that; "Generally, a cause of action accrues and the relevant statute of 
limitations begins to run 'upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of 
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action/ (cites omitted) A contract action ordinarily accrues at the time of the breach." Id at 
740. In Clarke v. Living Scriptures, Inc., 114 P. 3d 602 (Utah App. 2005), the court explained: 
"S&G stands for the proposition that, in a breach of contract case, one does not await the accrual 
of damages to begin the running of the statue of limitations/' Id at 604. 
This is a breach of contract case. Therefore, the "claim, dispute or other matter in 
question" arose upon the breach. That occurred at least as of February 5, 2007, the date Deer 
Crest terminated its contract with Silver Creek because of its breach. That occurred more than 
one year before Deer Crest filed its demand for arbitration. Therefore, the Arbitrator concludes 
that Deer Crest did not satisfy the requirement of Paragraph 19.1 that the demand be filed 
"within thirty days after the claim, dispute or other matter in question" arose. 
To determine the effect of failing to file the demand within the period set forth in the 
contract for filing the demand, the Arbitrator looks to the Utah Court of Appeals' recent decision 
in Kenny v. Rich, 605 Utah Adv. Rep, 12 filed May 30, 2008. In that case, the defendant sought 
arbitration of a dispute with a homeowner's association regarding its refusal to grant the 
defendant a variance from side yard requirements imposed by subdivision restrictive covenants. 
The declaration containing the covenants required that a party desiring arbitration of a decision 
by the homeowner's association must file a demand for arbitration within thirty days after 
receiving notice of the homeowner association's decision. The defendant filed his demand 
thirty-six days after he received the notice. On that basis, the Court ruled that the defendant had 
waived his right to arbitrate the dispute and that the arbitrators therefore lacked jurisdiction to 
arbitrate the dispute and allowed the homeowners association to proceed with its injunction 
action in court. 
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Based upon the foregoing authority, the Arbitrator is compelled to conclude that Deer 
Crest waived its right to arbitration under the Contract Documents by failing to file its demand 
within the time set forth in the Contract Documents. Therefore, the AAA lacks further 
jurisdiction to resolve this matter under the Contract Documents, 
Dated this 5th day of August, 2008. 
l^a/judS 
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HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, L.C. 
RiverView Plaza, Suite 300 
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Provo, Utah 84604-5663 
Telephone (801) 375-6600 
Attorneys for Silver Creek Development Group, LLC 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEER CREST ASSOCIATES I, L.C, a 
Utah Limited Liability Company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SILVER CREEK DEVELOPMENT 
GROUP LLC, 
Defendant. 
[PROPOSED] ORDER DENYING 
GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING 
IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
LIFT STAY 
Case No: 070500487 
Judge Derek P. Pullan 
This matter was called before the court on December 8, 2008 for a hearing on Plaintiffs 
Motion to Lift Stay. Plaintiff Deer Crest Associates I, L.C. ("Deer Crest") was represented by 
Eric G. Easterly. Defendant Silver Creek Development Group, LLC ("Silver Creek") was 
represented by Evan A. Schmutz. The Court having reviewed the pleadings and papers filed by 
the parties in connection with the Motion to Lift Stay and having given the parties an opportunity 
to present oral argument, the court took the matter under advisement without recessing court and 
thereafter issued a ruling from the bench, denying Deer Crest's Motion to Lift Stay. Good cause 
appearing, the Court now enters the following findings of fact, conclusions of law and order: 
Findings of Fact 
1. The Court finds that this matter was properly referred to arbitration and that the 
Arbitrator issued a written Decision on August 5, 2008, in which the Arbitrator granted Silver 
Creek's Motion to Dismiss. The Arbitrator dismissed Deer Crest's arbitration claim, finding that 
because of Deer Crest's failure to file a demand for arbitration within the thirty day limitation 
period set forth in the parties' agreement, the Arbitrator had no jurisdiction to hear Deer Crest's 
claim and the same was therefore dismissed. 
2. On July 1, 2005, the parties entered into an AIA A101-1997 Standard Form of 
Agreement Between Owner and Contractor ("Agreement"). Paragraph 19.1 of the Addenda to 
that Agreement, which was made an enforceable part of the Agreement, requires that "[a]U 
claims, disputes and other matters in question between the parties to this Agreement, arising out 
of or relating to this Agreement or the breach thereof, shall be decided by arbitration .... The 
demand [for arbitration] shall be made within thirty (30) days after the claim, dispute or other 
matter in question has arisen." 
3. The Court, having reviewed the record, finds that Deer Crest's demand for 
arbitration was filed beyond the thirty day limitation period set forth in paragraph 19.1 of the 
parties' agreement. 
4. The Agreement provides for that the prevailing party is entitled to an award of its 
attorney fees. 
Conclusions of Law 
1. The Court concludes as a matter of law that the Agreement between the parties is 
enforceable, and that the parties knowingly and intentionally agreed to submit any claim or 
dispute arising out of the Agreement to binding arbitration and agreed to be bound by paragraph 
19.1 of the Agreement and the thirty (30) day limitation on the time for filing an arbitration 
demand contained therein. 
2. The Court concludes as a matter of law that Deer Crest's execution of the 
Agreement constitutes a knowing and intentional waiver of any right to a judicial remedy under 
Article I, §§7 and 11 of the Utah Constitution. See Duke v. Graham, 158 P.2d 540, 546 (Utah 
2007). The Court concludes that strict enforcement of paragraph 19.1 of the Agreement would 
not violate Deer Crest's constitutional rights. 
3. The Court concludes that Deer Crest having waived any right to a judicial remedy, 
and having had its arbitration claim dismissed for failure to timely file the same, Deer Crest has 
no right to seek a judicial remedy. 
4. As the prevailing party in arbitration and in these judicial proceedings, Silver 
Creek is entitled to an award of its reasonable attorney fees. Silver Creek may establish the 
amount of attorney fees by affidavit and Deer Crest may object, if it desires to do so. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Deer Crest's Motion to Lift Stay is hereby granted for the limited purpose of 
allowing the Court to rule on the issue presented as to whether Deer Crest is entitled to seek a 
judicial remedy following a dismissal of its claim in arbitration, and to determine the amount of 
any fees which should be awarded to the prevailing party. 
2. Deer Crest's Motion is denied to the extent it seeks to lift the stay and proceed 
with its claims in this judicial proceeding. 
3. Deer Crest's Complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
4. Silver Creek is awarded its reasonable attorney fees in the amount of 
01 $ 7.333.STQ • /-<?-*? 
DATED this J ? day of December 2008. 
BY THE COURT: 
Approval as to Form: 
e Derek P. Pullan 
istrict Judge 
Eric G. Easterly 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Deer Crest Associates I, L.C. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the of December, 2008 she caused a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing to be delivered to the following: 
Eric G. Easterly 
2524 Fairway Village Drive 
P.O. Box 681238 
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